Is America really the Cause of our misery?

Is America really the Cause of our misery?
Pakistan Struggle:
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had initially joined the Congress was grossly dissatisfied with the Congress attitude towards Muslims and thus joined the Muslim League in 1913. It was with his efforts that Congress recognized the separate position of the Muslims and the Muslims' demand for a separate electorate as a part of the Lucknow Pact. However the Hindu prejudice against the Muslims could not be hidden for long and the publication of Nehru Report (1928) was a great setback to Lucknow Pact, since the Nehru Report negated all its clauses. It became evident that Congress and Hindus wanted to become the ruler of India on the basis of numerical strength and make Muslims their subjects. This was not acceptable to Muslims since they had ruled India for centuries and after British subjugation, they were again to fall under the Hindus as their subjects. Jinnah therefore refused to accept the report and presented his famous 14 Points to solve the political problems in India.
 The Muslims wished that their separate identity should be recognized and provided constitutional safeguards to protect their rights. It was then that the first proponents of independent Muslim nation began to appear. Among the first of these was writer/philosopher Allama Iqbal, who felt that a separate nation for Muslims was essential in an otherwise Hindu-dominated subcontinent. The cause found a leader in Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who became known as Father of the Nation and eventually persuaded the British to partition the region into Muslim-majority Pakistan, and Hindu-majority India.
 In the meantime Choudhary Rahmat Ali a ambridge student coined the word "PAKISTAN" for a would-be Muslim country, which was published on 28th January 1933 in the pamphlet "Now or Never."
Pak – US fluctuations in Relations:
The U.S. engagement with Pakistan has been fluctuating and bordering on being fickle. The indispensability of Pakistan for the U.S. has been directly proportional to the latter’s security calculations and threat prognosis. The Cold War witnessed the blossoming of the U.S.’s ties with Pakistan manifested in the form of CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan’s mortal enemy India, with its non-alignment policy, was reason enough for Pakistan to promptly ally with the U.S. The U.S. proved its commitment by tilting towards Pakistan in the 1971 war, but could not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan. The Soviet Union’s Afghanistan sojourn propelled Pakistan to the forefront of the U.S.’s containment agenda, and there amidst the Soviet Union’s hopeless attempt at expanding its influence was born with the U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi assistance the jihadist phenomena. The decade long ‘jihad’ against the Godless Communists in the eighties was important for another near irreversible development that of the Pakistani-Islamic bomb and the U.S.’s blind eye towards it. Both the creation of the Jihadists and the Pakistani bomb were to have disastrous consequences for the Americans and for a better part of the world.
The 1990’s
The U.S. interests in Pakistan diminished significantly when it went on a ‘holiday from history’, probably inadvertently leaving the recently formed Jihadists to breed and the Pakistani nuclear bomb program to mature. Pakistan’s station as a frontline state in America’s risk analysis dipped, and the U.S., which had so far been feigning innocence about Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, slammed the Pressler, Glenn, and Symmington amendments sanctions on it much to the chagrin of Pakistan. The 1998 nuclear tests, the Kargil war, and the Musharaff coup led to further disarray in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Clinton’s five-day visit to India and five-hour one to Pakistan took the already plummeting ties to their nadir, especially as any overture to Pakistan’s enemy number one was treated with the harshest scrutiny and deemed possibly as betrayal by Islamabad.
2001 and beyond
The U.S. hiatus from close ties with Pakistan was rudely shattered with the terrorist attacks of   September 11 2001. As the U.S. went into its longest war, Pakistan revised its role as the frontline and indispensable albeit temporary ally of the U.S., this time in the “war on terrorism”. It served as the conduit for supplies and safe passage of the U.S. and later NATO troops to Afghanistan, and allowed a U.S. presence on its Durand Line and its sovereign space, thereby accepting that parts of its territory were beyond effective control of Islamabad. Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terrorism was never openly questioned by the U.S. as over 20 billion dollars of aid poured into Pakistan in the past decade, although doubts of its competence arose time and again with little tangible contribution from Pakistan in dismantling, disrupting and destroying terrorism.
Frustration over Pakistan’s inability to deliver on the anti-terrorism front led the U.S. to attach conditions to the aid that it doled out to Pakistan. Growing U.S.-India ties possibly rankled Pakistan. India’s economic appeal, the possibility of it being propped up as a counter to an assertive China and its democratic success made it a ‘natural ally’ of the U.S. As India continued to grow economically, the U.S’s calculations probably showed rationality in forging closer and deeper ties with India, with whom historically the ties have been remote and for periods even bordered on antagonism and open confrontations. For Pakistan, this development probably implied a grave sin committed by the U.S. The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal concluded in 2008 doubtless sealed the relationship between the U.S. and India while Pakistan was left in the cold by its former ally.
The relations were perturbed under President Obama, ever since the Kerry-Lugar bill was passed in 2009, which put riders on the U.S. aid to Pakistan. The relations were further incensed with Obama’s insistence on nuclear non-proliferation and the pressures put on illegitimate nuclear powers like Pakistan to come into the folds of comprehensive test ban treaty and fissile materials cut-off treaty. Then again, President Obama’s visit to India and growing relations between them (November 2010) and his criticism of Pakistan in the Indian Parliament further exasperated the situation of unease and discomfort.
2011 saw the worst of this relationship, beginning with the storm over Raymond Davis, the CIA agent who was arrested (and later released on U.S. insistence and compensation) for killing two Pakistani citizens in late January. In May, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in a raid in Abbotabad which was barely a few kilometers away from Pakistan’s military academy. The raid, carried out without Pakistan’s knowledge, severely mortified its military and intelligence agencies. The Pakistani government retaliated by expelling 100 U.S. military trainers, it terminated counterinsurgency operations and restricted intelligence sharing with the U.S. and also insisted on an end to the drone attacks. On the other hand, many debates ensued in the U.S. congress to cut aid to Pakistan for following ‘two-faced policies’ towards terrorist outfits.
The detention of Dr. Fai in July 2011 (with established links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI) only added to the piling problems between the two countries.  Pakistan of late, has also demanded that the U.S. signs a memorandum of understanding with Pakistan specifying and defining U.S. rules of engagement inside Pakistan. The U.S., on the other hand, has refused to sign a binding document on such conditions of engagement. This issue might propel up more trouble for this already troubled relationship in the near future.
Way Forward:
But despite the this ; we cannot blame America for each and every thing as this has become a common excuse for our youth that they just are becoming lazy and putting everything on America.

Moiz Rafi Section H